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TESTIMONY
OF
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TIlE UNITED STATES

BEFORE

THE

ON CIVIL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUBCO~lliITTEE

9:30 A.M.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1976
WASHINGTON, D. C.

I welcome the opportunity to talk again with this
Subcommittee.

During the months since I last testified

here there has been much discussion about various incidents
which I described to you last February 27 involving the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The FBI's domestic security investigations have
received the most attention.

And much of it has centered on

COINTELPRO, which was revealed to this Subcommittee before I
arrived at the Department of Justice and about which I
provided further details by letter on May 17, 1975, when they
came to my attention.
From the beginning, this Subcommittee has been interested
in the FBI's domestic security investigations.

But it has

also been concerned with the whole range of FBI practices.
During my last appearance before this Subcommittee I promised
to start work preparing guidelines to govern FBI practices in
the future.

The preparation of those guidelines has been slow

and difficult--much slower and more difficult than I had
realized.

The problems are complex and important--as important

as any now facing the Department of Justice.

I had hoped when

I first appeared before this Subcommittee that I would be
able to present to you at my next appearance a complete set
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of guidelines.

This has proven impossible.

But progress

has been made in drafting guidelines in several areas.

You

have been provided with the most recent drafts of proposed
guidelines covering White House inquiries, investigations for
congressional staff and judicial staff appointments, the handling
of unsolicited mail, and domestic security investigations.
These draft guidelines cover many of the areas that have been
of greatest concern to this Subcommittee.
Because the statutory base for the operation of the
FBI is not satisfactory, I know the members of this Subcommittee
have been considering what changes it should enact.
guidelines may be helpful in these deliberations.

The
Before

discussing briefly each of the draft guidelines you have seen,
I would like to make a few points about the question of
statutory changes.
The basic statutory provision concerning the FBI is

28 U.S.C. 533 which provides that the Attorney General may
appoint officials "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against
the United

~tates;

(2) to assist in the protection of the"

President; and (3) to conduct such investigations regarding
official matters under the control of the Department of Justice
and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney
General."

In addition, 28 U.S.C. 531 declares that the Federal

Bureau of Investigation is in the Department of Justice.

l

There
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are other statutes, such as the Congressional Assassination,
Kidnapping and Assault Act, which vest in the Bureau certain
special responsibilities to investigate particular criminal
violations.
statemen~s

There are also Executive Orders and Presidential
and directives placing

investig~tory

responsibility

upon the Bureau.
In some areas--such as domestic security--the simple

statutory base I have just described is overlaid with a
series of executive orders (for example, Executive Order 10450
concerning the federal loyalty program) and directives dating
back decades.

The simplicity of the statute vanishes when

placed in this setting.

Moreover·, the authorized work of the

Bureau in terms of crime detection must be seen in the context
of statutes passed by Congress such as the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.
2~85,

the seditious conspiracy law, 18 U.S.C. 2384, and the

rebellion and insurrection statute, 18 U.S.C. 2383.

I would

.like to begin the discussion today by suggesting a few
considerations that should be taken into account in deciding
what statutory ·changes should be made to define more clearly
the areas of the Bureau's jurisdiction and the means and
methods which the Bureau is permitted to use in carrying out
its assigned tasks.
First, there is a temptation to resort to having the
courts make many difficult day-to-day decisions about investigations.
When a Fourth Amendment search or. seizure is involved, of
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course, recourse to a court for a judicial warrant is in most
circumstances required.

But the temptation is to extend the use

of warrants into areas where warrants are not constitutionally
required.

For example, as you know it has been suggested

that the FBI ought to obtain a warrant before using an informant.
Extending the warrant requirement in this way would be a major
step toward an alteration in the basic nature of the criminal
justice sys tern in America.

I t would be a s tep

to~vard

the

inquisitorial system in which judges, and not members of the
executive, actually control the investigation of crimes.
is the system used in some

Europea~

This

countries and elsewhere,

but our system of justice keeps the investigation and
prosecution of crime separate from the adjudication of criminal
charges.

The separation is important to the neutrality of the

judiciary, a neutrality which our system takes pains to protect.
There is another, related consideration.

To require

judges to decide whether particular informants may be used in
particular cases would bring the judiciary into the most
important and least definable part of the investigative process.
Even disregarding the problem of delay to investigations and
the burden that would be placed upon courts, we must ask ourselves whether the control of human sources of information-which involves subtle, day-to-day judgments about credibility
and personality--is something judges ought to be asked to
undertake.

It would place an enormous responsibility upon courts

which either would be handled perfunctorily or, if handled with
care, would place a tremendous burden of work on federal judges.
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In drafting statutory changes, it must be remembered

that rigid directions governing every step in the investigative
process could sacrifice the flexibility that is necessary if
an investigative agency is to adapt to the diverse factual
situations it must face.

Rigid statutory provisions would

invite litigation at every step in the investigative process.
Such litigation could very well be used by clever individuals
to frustrate legitimate law enforcement efforts without
achieving the measure of control for which the statutes were
enacted.

As Lord Devlin has said, "As 300n as anything has

been codified, there is a lawyer-like--but sometimes unfortunate-_
tendency to treat the written word as if it were the last
word on the subject and to deal with each case according to
wllether it falls on one side or the other of what may be a
finely drawn boundary."
.These considerations do not in any way mean that Congress
ought not act to clarify the FBI's statutory base.

I want

to emphasize my belief that Congress should do so.

The

problems I have mentioned are surmountable.

The Department of

Justice is ready to work with Congress in drafting statutes
that will meet the issues that have been raised about the
responsibilities of the FBI.
The proposed guidelines are part of our effort to
cooperate witll Congress in meeting its legislative responsibility.
Some of what has been proposed in the guidelines may be useful

- 6 -

in drafting statutes.

Other parts of the guidelines may

best be left to regulations or Executive Orders.

As I said

in my earlier testimony before this Subcommittee, consultation
with you and with other Congressional committees is an
important part of the process by which these guidelines can
be perfected.

There will not be complete ag~eement about what

has been proposed--indeed, within the Department of Justice
there is some disagreement about some provisions--but this is
inevitable and is a necessary part of the road we must travel.
He welcome discussion, which is also essential.

Let me then

briefly describe the four proposed guidelines that have been
substantially completed and have been provided to you.

Others--

y,'hich wi 11 cover criminal inves tiga tions, use of informants,
coun~er-intelligence investigations and other areas--are

currently being drafted by a committee within the Department
chaired by Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
the Office of Legal Counsel, and composed of representatives
of the Civil Rights and Criminal Divisions, the Office of
Policy and Planning, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the Attorney General's Office.

As new guidelines are drafted

in these areas they, too, will be made available to you.
\vhen I testified before this Subcommittee last
J'\'bruary I described a nwnber of inciden ts which occurred
in a period dating back more than a decade in which the

rur
most

was misused for political purposes.

I noted that in

cases we discovered \"here the Hhite House was involved
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482
the ·initiation of an improper request was made by a White
House staff member--acting in the President's name--to a
counterpart in the FBI.
orally.

These requests were often made

\.Jr1i te Hous e s taf f members in a number of different

.

positions were involved .
As you know,

the FBI conducts background investigations

of persons being considered for appointment by the President
either to positions in government departments or agencies or
to the White House staff.

The FBI also checks it files and

sometimes conducts further investigations of persons who will
be in contact with the President or who will be given access
to classified information.

The iUideline concerning mlite

House inquiries sets up a procedure--which is already
substantially being followed--which requires that requests

for all such investigations be made in writing by the President
or the Counselor Associate Counsel to the President.

Under

the proposed guidelines the request for an investigation would
have to certify that the person to be investigated has

consented to the investigation with the knowledge that information
gathered in the investigation would be retained by the FBI.

The consent provision is important as a mechanism for preventing
investigations in fact sought for political or other purposes
from being initiated in the use of background investigationL
It is also important as a protection of the privacy interests
of persons to be investigated,

There are provisions requiring

483
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that access to information provided to the White House be
strictly limited to those directly involved in the matter
for which the investigation was initiated.

Custodians of

the files in the White House would be required to keep a
list of all persons who were given access.

The proposed

guidelines concerning congressional staff and judicial staff
appointments take the same basic approach as the guidelines
concerning White Hou3e inquiries.
In addition the White House has been following the
practice, which perhaps should be embodied in the guidelines,
of directing through the Attorney General's Office all requests
for investigation or for material from Bureau files except
routine background checks.
past~

This was not the policy in the

It reflects the Attorney General's role, which I

described to you last year, as a lightning rod to deflect
improper requests.
The proposed guidelines on the White House inquiries
and on other matters accept the proposition that FBI files
should be desttoyed after a reasonable period of time.

The

deadlines for destruction of files have not yet been specified,
however, because for administrative reasons these deadlines
must be coordinated throughput the FBI file system.
The last time I appeared before this Subcommittee many
members were concerned about the hrindling of unsolicited
derogatory information received by the FBI.

Unsolicited
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information can be very valuable in law enforcement, as you
know, but the concern has been that allegations about the
private lives and habits of individuals have found their way
into FBI files where they may remain for great lengths of
time as a silent but troublesome invasion of individual
privacy.

In my testimony of last February 27, I suggested

that on balance it would be desirable to devise some procedure
under which some information in Bureau files would be destroyed.
The guidelines concerning unsolicited information set up a
procedure for the early

destruction~f

such information when

it does not relate to matters within the jurisdiction of the
federal government or does not make an allegation of a serious
crime within the jurisdiction of state or local police agencies.
The draft guidelines provide for destruction of such unsolicited
information within 90 days.

The period after which other files

would be required to be destroyed may vary.

Information collected

in background investigations might be retained long enough
to avoid the need to repeat investigative steps as an individual
moves from job to job within government or out of goverrunent

------

and later back in.

On the other hand, destruction of files

developed in preliminary domestic security investigations may
be required quite quickly if information indicating criminal
conduct is not developed.

7
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Finally I come to the proposed guidelines concerning
the controversial area of domestic security inve,stigations.
I have already testified about these guidelines before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Since that testimony,

several changes have been made in the draft.

You have been

provided with the latest draft of these guidelines.

There

are several important features I would like to describe.
First, the proposed domestic security guidelines
proceed from the proposition that government monitoring of
individuals or groups because they hold unpopular or controversial
political views is intolerable in

o~r

society.

This is the

meaning of the warning issued by former Attorney General
Harlan Fiske Stone, as I read it.

Stone said, "There is always

the possibility that a secret police may become a menace to
free government and free institutions, because it carries with
it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always
quickly apprehended or understood . . . It is important that
its activities be strictly limited to the performance of those
functions for which it was created and that its agents themselves
be not above the law or beyond its reach . . . The Bureau of
Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions
of individuals.

It is concerned only with their conduct and

then only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of
the United States.

When a police system passes beyond these

limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice
nnd to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to

cherish."

- 11 -
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The proposed guiderines tie domestic security
investigations closely to the violation of federal law.
I realize there is an argument as to whether the guidelines
tie domestic security investigations closely enough or too
closely to the detection of criminal misconduct.

.

But the

main thing in my opinion is that th~ purpos~ of the investigation
must be the detection of unlawful conduct and not merely the
monitoring of disfavored or troublesome activities and surely
not of unpopular views.

This ~s accomplished in the guidelines

by requiring some showing that the activities under investigation
involve or will involve the use of force or violence and the
violation of federal law.

I must admit there is a problem--

in part a drafting problem but perhaps more than that--O f how
to describe or set forth a standard which further specifies what
is meant by "some showing."
Because investigations into criminal conduct in the
domestic security area may raise significant First Amendment
issues, the proposed guidelines provide for compendious reporting
on such investigations to the Department of Justice.

In general

the guidelin~s provide for a much greater involvement by the
rest of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General in
reviewing FBI domestic security investigations.

The emphasis

upon departmental and congressional review is important, but
it must be recognized that the Bureau must have primary
responsibility for controlling itself.
to strike an appropriate balance.

The guidelines attempt

Periodic reports by the

Bureau of preliminary investigations would be required.

All

- 12 full investigations would have to be reported to the Attorney
General or his designee within one week of their opening.

The

Attorney General or his designee could close any investigation.
FBI Headquarters would be required to review the results of
full investigations
periodically and to close any when it
.
,

appears that the standard for opening a full investigation is
not satisfied and all logical leads have been exhausted or are
not likely to be productive.

Each open case would be reviewed

annually in the Department of Justice and would be closed if
no longer justified under the standards.

The personal approiral

of the Attorney General would be required when such sensitive
techniques as Title III electronic ·surveillance or preventive
action are to be used, and the Attorney General would be
required to report to Congress periodically on the instances,

if any, in which preventive action was taken.
Preliminary investigations--which would not involve
the infiltration of informants into organizations or groups
or such' techniques as electronic surveillance or mail covers-would be authorized only on the basis of information or
allegations that an individual, or individuals acting in
concert, may be engaged in activities which involve or will
involve the use of force or violence and ,the violation of federal
law for one of five designated purposes.

Those criminal

purposes are:
(1) overthrowing the government of
the United States or the government
of a State;

- 13 (2) interfering, in the United States,
with the activities of a foreign
government or its authorized represen-

(3) impairing for the purpose of
influencing U.S. government policies
or decisions:
(a) the functioning of the
government of the United States;
(b) the functioning of the
\

government of a State; or
(c) interstate c.ommerce.
(4) depriving persons of their civil
righ ts under the Cons ti tu tion, laws,
or treaties of the United States; or
(5) engaging in domestic violence or
rioting when such violence or rioting
is likely to require the use of the
federal militia or other armed forces.
Preliminary

~~stigations

would be limited to inquiries of

public record and other public sources; FBI files and indices;
federal, state and local records; and existing informants
and sources.

Interviews and physical surveillance undertaken

for the limited purpose of identifying the subject of the
investigation would be allowed, but interviews or surveillance
for any other purpose would require the written authorization
of the Special Agent in Charge of the appropriate Bureau field
office.
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The draft guidelines provide that such intrusive
investigative techniques as infiltration of informants into
organizations and use of electronic surveillance and mail
covers may only be initiated as a part of full investigations.
The guidelines set out the following standard for the opening
of a full investigation:
"Full investigations must be
authorized by the FBI Headquarters.
They may only be authorized on the
basis of specific and articulable
facts giving reason to believe that
an individual or individuals acting
in concert are or may be engaged in
activities which involve or will
involve the use of force or violence
and the violation of federal law for
one or more" of the five purposes I
mentioned earlier.
A provision is also included to allow the FBI to
investigate for limited periods of time in situations in which
domestic violence or rioting not violating federal law is
likely to result in a request by a governor or legislature of
a stale under 10 U.S.C. 331 for the use of federal troops.
You will recognize that the standard for opening a

full investigation proposed in the guidelines is the equivalent
of the standard for a street stop and frisk enunciated by

4 ~J 0
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the Supreme Court in Terry

v.~.

There the Supreme Court

wrote that in justifying a street search a police officer "must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
when taken together with rational inferences from those facts.
reasonably warrant the intrusion."

In his st.nnmation of the

holding of the Court, Chief Justice Harren wrote:
We . . . hold today that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the Course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to
assault him.

(empha~is added)

(392 U.S. 1, 30)

- 16 This standard was adopted because it requires a
strong showing of criminal conduct before a full investigation
is authorized.

I should point out that a change was made

in this part of the guidelines since my testimony before
the Senate Select Committee.

Originally the standard had

required a showing of specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that the subjects of the investigation are
engaged in activities that involve or will involve force and
violence and the violation of federal law.

The change to

t~e

phrase "are or may be" brings the ',formula tion of the
standard more closely in line with the Terry standard.

The

previous language of the guidelines proved to be too close
to the arrest standard--that is, too restrictive as a
standard for the opening of an investigation.

The close

correspondence of the revised draft's standard with the Terry

.

language gives the guidelines' formulation a foundation in the
Supreme Court's analysis of an analagous constitutional problem
which, while it involves a different area of law enforcement,
does provide a·definition for the standard which is to control

----

Bureau activities.
The proposed guidelines go on to require an additional
consideration before a full investigation is opened.
~uidelines

The

state:
[T]he following factors must be
considered in determining whether a
full investigation should be undertaken:
(1) the magnitude of the threatened

harm;

492

- 17 (2) the likelihood it will occur;
(3) the immediacy of the threat;
and
(4) the danger to privacy and free
expression posed by a full investigation.
This listing of factors, which has been added in the latest
draft, gives the standard a dimension and explicitness it
did not have in earlier drafts.

For example, the balancing

of the factors would require officials of the FBI and the
Department of Justice to close any full investigation even
if there is clear threat of a violation of federal law if
the threatened harm is de minimus or unlikely or remote in
time.
Finally, the draft guidelines provide a procedure to
be followed in emergency situations when action by the FBI to
·'.'intervene to prevent the use of illegal force and violence
may be required.

This section of the proposed guidelines

has proven to-be controversial, in part for fear that it
seeks to allow the FBI to engage in activities of the sort
that were involved in COINTELPRO.

As I have said many times

before, the activities that went under the name COINTELPRO
were either foolish or outrageous, and the preventive action
section of the guidelines was not intended to legitimize
such activities, nor would it do so.

It was included in the

draft guidelines in the recognition that emergency situations
may arise in which human life or the essential functioning

I

49.3
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of government may be threatened.

In such situations law

enforcement officials would be expecte~ to act to save life
or protect the functioning of government.

Indeed, law

enforcement officials would be condemned if they did not act.
The preventive action section of the guidelines was designed
to provide a procedure for the Attorney General to authorize
and report to Congress such activities.

It was designed to

set up an orderly and careful procedure to be followed in
the case of emergency.

It could be ~upplemented by further

rules developed by the Attorney General.

Under the proposed

guidelines the Attorney General could authorize a preventive
action only when there is probabl~ cause to believe that
illegal force or violence will be used and that it threatens
life or the essential functioning of government.

The Attorney

General could authorize preventive action only when it is
necessary to minimize the danger, that is, when other techniques
will not work.

In the latest draft of the guidelines several

specific prohibitions were included to make clear that new
COINTELPRO are not to be sanctioned.

Prohibited are the

commission or instigation by the FBI of criminal acts; the
dissemination of information for the purpose of holding an
individual or group up to scorn, ridicule, or disgrace; the
dissemination of information anon~nously or under false
identity; and the incitement of violence.
It may be that Congress will choose to prohibit any

FBI efforts to intervene to prevent force or violence.
to do so carries with it a risk and a responsibility.

But

494

- 19 The proposed guidelines are still in the process of
revision.

They are tentative.

As the guidelines have

been developed they have been shown to the Chairman of this
Subcommittee.

We must enunciate the differences among us

about the best words to use and then seek to resolve those
differences.

But the main thrust of the guidelines is surely

the most important thing, their recognition of the need for a
program for destruction of files in the interest of privacy,
their requirement of consent from the subject of background
investigations, their requirement of progressively higher
standards and higher levels of review for more intrusive
investigative techniques, their requirement that domestic
security investigations be tied closely with the detection
of crime, and their safeguards against investigations of
activities that are merely troublesome or unpopular.

Upon

these main themes I hope we all agree.
The Department of Justice has undertaken other steps
to meet some of the issues of concern to this Subcommittee.
We have created an Office'of Professional Responsibility to
investigate-allegations of improper conduct by Department
personnel and to review the investigations done by internal
inspection units of agencies within the Department.

We have

been trying to work out a legislative proposal to bring
national security wiretapping and microphone surveillance
under a judicial warrant procedure.

On June 24, 1975, I

- 20 -

495

provided the Chairman of the House Ju4iciary Con@ittee with
statistics concerning the use of national security electronic
surveillance instituted without prior judicial approval.
;,

Before the Church Corrunittee I recounted the history of
national security electronic surveillance since 1940, revealing
a year-by-year count of the number of telephon~ and microphone
surveillances.

The latest figures in this area show that in

1975 a total of 122 telephone wiretaps and 24 microphone
devices were used to overhear convers~tions.
\ve have tried to be cooperative with this and other
committees of Congress about other aspects of the past history
of the FBI and other agencies withiri the Department.

We have

tried to reveal as much as possible about the past out of a
sense of comity and a feeling that the past problems must be
discussed in the process of creating new policy.

But we have

tried also to recognize that the past is not always the best
guide to the future.

As we review recent history we may be so

overwhelmed by it--and by our failure of memory about the social
and political forces that shaped recent history--that we will

"'-.

read its lessons more broadly than we ought to.

If there was

a lack of humility in the past about the perfection of our
vision of what was proper, I hope we cannot fail to recognize
the flaws in our vision about the past and the future today.
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It is a challenging and interesting time, and I hope
together we can prepare ourselves wisely for the future.

We

cannot escape from the responsibility of looking at the problems
we face today and are likely to face in the future.
When I testified almost one year ago I stated to this
corrnnittee--and I want to emphasize most strongly again today-that I have both a personal and official concern for the issues
which face us in this area,

Those issues are close to the basic

duties of the Attorney General to protect the society--its
values, and the safety of its members.

I am sure that

Director Kelley will agree with me that we must clarify for
the present and for the future the kind of course to be
followed, meticulously and candidly.

I believe we have already

made considerable progress in this regard.

Together with

Congress legislation can be worked out and wise policy achie,:ed.

